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Theme IV: International Politics and the
Role of Law
C ONTESTATION OF THE OUTCOMES AND PROCEDURES OF THE
EXISTING LEGAL REGIME
David Kennedy*
My thesis is that our problem is not a lack of law but a surfeit of law, that the
situation of international political culture at the moment is not one in which we
need to worry about making the legal culture more dense, rather that we should
worry about ﬁnding sites and opportunities for increasing the possibility for politics,
for contestation of the outcomes and procedures of the existing legal regime. The
difﬁculty is how to do that. How does one build the possibility for politics, progressive
or otherwise, in such a technocratic decision-making structure?
The new empire is not the United States. The United States is part of it, is a convenient way of referring to one set of political institutions and interests that participate
in the new governance structure, but the United States is – and the US political class
experiences itself – as vulnerable to international governance. The new technocratic
decision-making empire is also not the United Nations and not the World Trade Organization (WTO) and not the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); it is
not the institutions which we think of as at the foreground of international public
law and I would also say that it is not a class conspiracy. My hesitation in adopting the
class vocabulary is the impression it gives of there being people willing it in terms
of their own interest. If you speak with major decision-makers in multinational corporations, they, like the US government, experience themselves as buffeted as much
by ﬁnancial instability and by the changing conditions for business as does the political leadership, even of the most powerful countries. I do not want to deny the very
important point that Erwin Lanc put on the table, that just because everyone feels
vulnerable does not mean that everybody is vulnerable in the same way. The vulnerabilities are different and the capacities are different, but I think we need to ﬁnd
a vocabulary for speaking about the technocratic decision-making empire, without
mechanically invoking the WTO, the United States or the technocratic class. The
Hardt/Negri book makes an effort to describe empire in a more disembodied way,
but the end result is to make the whole thing seem much more mysterious than it
is. In my view, it is actually far simpler. The global governance structure is wherever
experts do things with rules. Wherever two experts are gathered in the name of
deciding something there is governance. Experts contest among themselves in the
terms of their expertise the best practice out of which they decide what to do. This
is true even in a situation like Iraq. It appears that there is an important political
conversation going on in the UN Security Council, but so much of the decision about
what to do in Iraq is driven by a series of decisions taken by military experts, by
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political experts, by weapons experts, by economic experts, and by trade experts in
a variety of different locations, so that their decisions come together in a timetable
for the invasion of Iraq in a way that makes it very difﬁcult even for the president
of the United States to feel he has strong decision-making control. Treating this as
Bush’s war is an interesting locutional way of locating political contestation. If war
happens, it will be a military exercise, which emerges out of a thousand decisions
difﬁcult to locate.
Contesting expertise means bringing things from the background into the foreground. It means not being bedazzled by the temptation to treat the foreground
political choices and institutions as the most important ones. It means self-conscious
disregard for the centrality of the Security Council or the US presidency in thinking about the invasion or potential invasion of Iraq. It means, where foreground is
politics, let us look at the legal structure beneath it. Where foreground is the public law institutions of the World Trade Organization, bring to the fore the private
law rules of contract and transaction in the background. In this we need a better
theory of how these background rules and institutions concentrate authority, and a
better theory of what the effects of these authorities are and of their distributional
consequences. Both Professor Chimni and Professor Marks’s papers were aimed
precisely at developing that kind of improved expertise. Once having brought the
background into the foreground we need to contest its terms. That requires entering
into expertise in some way. I agree with Professor Rajagopal that there is no external position from which one can easily understand where the points of possible
contestation are; there is just no other way but through. We need to get into the
vocabulary of the experts and ﬁgure out where the soft and potential open points
are, while at the same time avoiding the temptation to think that the choices the
expert vocabulary puts before us are the only available choices. I think that, most
importantly, I should like to see an international law that encouraged experts to
experience themselves as not knowing what to do, to experience the gaps in their
own expertise, to imagine experts who were disenchanted from their own best
practice, or who were more attentive to the gaps and conﬂicts within their own
expert vocabulary than to the easy solutions. The idea here is to encourage each
expert to think of him/herself as deciding about the exception rather than applying
the rule.
What is the possible role for law in all this? It has been the role of law to proliferate
expert institutions and to provide the vocabulary for expert disputation. It has been
the role of law to develop the easy expert alternatives to some of the most difﬁcult
global problems in the area of politics, security, and the economy, but most of the
alternatives developed by international law, as we have described and discussed repeatedly over the past two days, are themselves part of what I think of as the overall
expert vocabulary of the international legal order. The call for multilateralism, the
call for human rights to chase political or economic decisions, the call for institutional reform and renewal are components of what experts have offered as they
govern, not alternatives to the governance of experts. Law need not be on the side of
the consolidation of expertise – we could imagine a law, an international law, which
supported the translation of its decisions into political terms. Transparency alone
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is not enough. It is not focused on the problem of contesting and translating, rather
than simply exposing. We could imagine an international law which encouraged
the idea of multiple best practice. We could imagine an international law which
sought to disenchant its speakers from their own expert authority rather than to
offer them the promise that theirs was the last, best, humanitarian position available. This would not be the international law of the multilateral left, of civil society
and of human rights, but I think it would be an international law more attuned to
human possibility, expert responsibility, and political contestation.

T HE MODERNIZING PROJECT IN C OLOMBIA : AN UNFINISHED GOAL ?
Helena Alviar*
For us, as Latin Americans, the search for poetic modernity runs historically parallel to
the repeated attempts to modernize our countries. This tendency begins at the end of
the 18th Century and includes Spain herself. The United States was born into modernity
and by 1830 was already, as de Tocqueville observed, the womb of the future; we were
born at a moment when Spain and Portugal were moving away from modernity. This is
why there was frequent talk of ‘Europeanizing’ our countries: the modern was outside
and had to be imported.1

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the goal of modernizing Colombian
society was an obsession that was translated into constitutional reforms and legal
institutions. Right after independence, members of the liberal and conservative
parties agreed that the organization of the state should be a democratic, liberal2
regime.
The nineteenth century in Colombia was the liberal modernizing century . . . The
elites devoted their energy to the forming of a modern nation, understood as a Western,
culturally white – though based on the myth of a racially mixed – nation.3

These modernizing impulses mark the place of Colombia within the international
order. This position within the global order is a response to the selective transplant of
certain modernization ideals which were designed and structured as a consequence
of the constant struggle between members of the conservative and liberal parties.
This selection was done by transplanting half-heartedly Western/modern concepts,
privileging some over others. Nevertheless, this import/transplant at the same time
restrained the possibilities of the political, economic and social elites, in a way

*

1.
2.

3.

Professor, Universidad de Los Andes.
Octavio Paz, ‘In Search of the Present’ (Nobel Prize Lecture, 1990).
As a matter of fact, the liberal party was deﬁned as the anti-colonialist party. This anti-colonialist quest
was seen as a cultural, economic, and political break from Spain and the link to the ideals set out by the
Enlightenment. Many historians have described this change of cultural, political, and economic inﬂuences,
among them: J. Jaramillo Uribe, ‘Etapas y Sentido de la Historia de Colombia’, in M. Arrubla (ed.), Colombia
Hoy (1990), at 15–52; G. Molina, Las Ideas Liberales en Colombia, I (1984), at 35–9; A. Gómez Muller, ‘Las Formas
de Exclusión: La Perspectiva de José Marı́a Samper’, (1991) 11 (August) Revista Gaceta, at 31–4.
M. Palacios, ‘Modernidad, Modernizaciones y Ciencias Sociales’, in idem, Parabola del Liberalismo (1999), 31
(author’s translation).
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limiting the institutional arrangements they imagined and structured. As the quote
from Octavio Paz suggests, ‘the modern was outside and had to be imported’.
In Colombia, the two mainstream explanations surrounding the ‘backwardness’ of the country have been as follows. From a liberal/mainstream perspective,
although all of the elements of modernization – a political revolution, meaning
a liberal, sovereign, democratic regime; a socio-economic transformation, deﬁned
as the shift from a feudal economy based on the export of agricultural products
to a capitalist, industrial system; and a cultural break, understood as a move away
from tradition, the secularization of the educational system, and the separation of
church and state – have been designed as legal transformations, Colombia has been
unsuccessful in reaching what has been deﬁned elusively as ‘the modern’, because
the transformations take time to consolidate. In this sense it is a matter of time and
of constant tinkering with the legal institutions to make them as Western as possible, incorporating all the changes and transformations that have been historically
applied within the tradition of great democracies.4 In this sense, they understand
that not all of the revolutions have fully taken place, but progress cannot be stopped
once it is set in motion.5 This interpretation has a variation, according to which
such failures can be explained because of the control of the democratic system by
a set of particular group interests and because of the general backwardness of the
population.6
On the other hand, the interpretation by the Dependency Movement7 of Colombian backwardness is centred on economically dependent relations with ‘core nations’8 which have determined and limited the transformations necessary to reach
modernity. This group of academics is pessimistic about the content, beneﬁts, and
structure of the modernizing project, given the actual setting of the international
economic order and voices a critique of the process of importing foreign/imperialist
ideas.9
The modernization project in Colombia
As I stated above, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the goal of modernizing Colombian society was an obsession that was translated into constitutional
reforms and legal institutions. In a peripheral country as Colombia, modernization
ideals are inexorably linked to globalization in the sense that they are transmitted
and transplanted through the encounter with the West.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

During the nineteenth century France and England were the models, and during the twentieth century the
United States has taken over as the example to follow.
Palacios, supra note 3.
See among others, D. Echandı́a, Ideologı́a y Polı́tica, Obras Selectas, III (1981); A. Tirado Mejı́a, ‘Colombia Siglo
y Medio de Bipartidismo’, in Arrubla, supra note 2, 102–86.
The Marxist-oriented theoretical movement of the late 1960s, which was very strong in Latin America and
whose main ﬁgures were among others Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto.
Core nations are the industrialized Western European countries as well as the United States.
Most of these are Dependency-oriented historians and more recently A. Escobar, Encountering Development:
The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (1992).
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The idea of importing Western/modern legal systems was always present, seeming
as it did to guarantee the path to modernity.
Independence came at a time when England appeared as the economic development
model and the United States as the most successful growth process of a nation recently
independent. Therefore, the modernization ideals were the establishment of a capitalist
economy and a liberal political system based on popular sovereignty. By 1850 this
modernizing project was part of the fundamental ideology of ruling elites who felt
that the system was going in the right direction. After all, an independent state had
been formed, whose institutional bases were both a constitutional and legal system
transplanted from continental Europe: a written set of laws, separation of powers, the
election of certain public ofﬁcials, a criminal and a civil code imported from France.10

Nevertheless, the necessary elements of an economic, political, or cultural revolution were never truly incorporated. Although certain ideas were transplanted and
translated into laws, this transplant operated more in terms of what is described by
P. G. Monateri as ‘interested non-neutral, purposive projects of governance’ which
grew ‘within the frameworks of different legal traditions, responding to inner needs
of legal elites’.11
In this sense, neither the progress narrative suggested by Colombian liberals
nor the dependent economic structure suggested by the leftist-oriented academics
provide a full picture of how modernization has been structured within the country
and how it has determined the country’s position within the international community. I propose to look at these modernizing ideals that have been translated into
laws – through constitutional changes, economic development plans, and educational reforms – as a way of understanding the Colombian context and have become
an ideology in the sense that they encompass ‘the set of beliefs, ideas, and values
embodied in the legal institutions and legal materials . . . of a particular society’.12
In this sense, there has been a partial ideal of modernization translated into norms
(giving the legal system an instrumental role) that has given the appearance of unfulﬁlled, but existing, goals. The general agreement that these goals are part of the
legal institutions has either distorted reality or marginalized alternatives.

R ESISTING CULTURE
Joel R. Paul*
Cultural resistance to globalization takes many forms in international conﬂict:
governments seek to protect national culture from the homogenizing inﬂuence
of globalization by imposing restraints on trade and commerce; religious fundamentalists launch violent attacks against secular governments; national subgroups
10.

J. Orlando Melo, ‘Algunas Consideraciones Globales sobre “modernidad” y “modernización”’, in F. Viviescas
and F. Giraldo (eds.), Colombia el Despertar de la Modernidad (1991), 232 (author’s translation).
11. P. G. Monateri, ‘“Everybody’s Talking”: The Future of Comparative Law’, (1998) 21 Hastings International and
Comparative Law Review 825, at 4.
12. J. D. Leonard, Legal Studies as Cultural Studies: A Reader in (post) Modern Critical Theory (1995), 23.
*
Professor, University of California Hastings College of the Law; former trade policy advisor to President
Bill Clinton.
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ﬁght for cultural autonomy. At best, international law has an ambivalent attitude
towards culture, and this ambivalence has sustained, rather than resolved, conﬂict.
International law needs to address culture by establishing rules and institutions that
minimize conﬂict by containing culture.
I have three related points. First, the problem of culture is inherent in international
law, and culture should be seen as competing against the universalist claims of
international law. Second, international law variously denies and defends cultural
claims in ways that facilitate globalization and undermine human rights. Third,
progressive international legal scholars should resist every effort to reify culture as
an exception to legal norms.
My ﬁrst point is that cultural conﬂict is built into the architecture of international law. Our conception of the nation-state is centred on an idea of a national
culture that legitimates the exercise of sovereign authority both internally and
externally. Internally, the idea of a national culture creates a common bond of nationality among citizens and between citizens and the state. Externally, the state
acts to promote national culture. Since positive international law is rooted in the
consent of sovereign states, states often try to use international law as an instrument
of cultural hegemony. The connection between sovereignty and culture leads to a
fundamental conﬂict between cultural claims and international legal norms. International law’s legitimacy derives from its claim of universalism. Cultural claims are
a denial of universalism. Culture in this sense undermines international law and
legal institutions.
Second, international law treats cultural claims inconsistently. Typically, the
conﬂict between culture and international law arises when state actors and international lawyers seek to justify some derogation from an international legal norm by
asserting a cultural claim. For example, Argentina, China, and Iran assert cultural
exceptions to the international norm of gender equality. Deploying culture as a legal
category is highly problematic; culture is a contested idea. Herder wrote that ‘nothing is more indeterminate than this word, and nothing is more deceptive than its
application to all nations and periods’.13 The European powers enlisted this idea of
culture as a justiﬁcation for their colonization. The colonial powers offered culture
and Christianity to indigenous peoples in exchange for land and wealth. Herder, by
contrast, romanticized the culture of these indigenous societies as superior to the
formalism of European culture. Modern anthropologists accept that our idea of culture is so intertwined with history, gender, race, and ethnography that no observer
can escape the trap of subjectivity. Deploying culture as a legal category is a risky
business.
Consider how international law both denies and accommodates culture using
three examples concerning cultural claims against international environmental
norms, free-trade norms, and human rights norms.

13.

J. G. Von Herder, Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind (1784). Herder was reacting against the
eighteenth-century idea of German philosophers that ‘Kultur ’, which had originally referred to the cultivation
of crops or animals, could also describe the process of civilization.
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First, international environmental norms generally have not accommodated cultural differences. The 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES) prohibits trade in certain threatened or endangered species of animals and
plants. CITES does not contain an exception for cultural purposes, even though
some of these animals and plants are highly valued in certain countries as decorative objects, medicines, and aphrodisiacs. A more speciﬁc example of the rejection
of cultural claims concerns the moratorium of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) on hunting certain species of whales. Japan and Norway claim that they
have a cultural right to engage in whaling. They argue that whale meat is a cultural
delicacy consumed on special holidays and that whaling has sustained traditional
communities for centuries. The IWC has rejected Japan’s and Norway’s cultural
claims, despite evidence that there are authentic traditional practices and values
associated with whale hunting in these countries.
Another example of how international law rejects cultural exceptions concerns
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) administered by the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Canada fears the cultural dominance of the United
States in its market.14 It tried to prevent the import of US magazines into Canada
by imposing tariffs, and the US publishers responded by printing the magazines in
Canada with minimal Canadian content. Canada then imposed high excise taxes
on the US editions printed in Canada. The United States responded by challenging
the Canadian taxes as a violation of Article III of the GATT. Article III requires
countries to extend national treatment to like products that originate in other
member states. The United States argued that Canadian magazines were not subject
to the same excise taxes as like US magazines. Canada’s defence was that US and
Canadian magazines were not ‘like products’. They were distinguishable precisely
because of their different national cultural content. In essence, Canada asserted a
cultural exception to the GATT principle of national treatment for like products. In
1997 the Appellate Body of the WTO found that Canada had violated the national
treatment provision of GATT.15 The Appellate Body rejected Canada’s argument that,
based on national origin, cultural goods are inherently different. The Appellate Body
instead took the view that cultural goods are homogeneous. No cultural exception
to GATT’s principles could be tolerated. This decision is consistent with a number
of other opinions in which GATT panels have rejected cultural exceptions.16
By contrast, the international community is willing to consider cultural exceptions to the international norm of gender equality. In various international instruments states have accepted gender equality with a cultural qualiﬁcation. For

14.
15.
16.

According to one study, 95% of ﬁlms shown in Canada are US productions, and 80% of Canadian television
news originates in the United States.
WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada B, Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, adopted 30 June 1997,
WT/DS31/AB/R.
E.g., GATT Dispute Panel Report on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, adopted 15 May 1984, L/5623315/94, para. 44 (ﬁnding that an import licensing scheme to protect an import-competing cultural minority
community violated GATT Art. XI prohibiting import quotas); Report of Panel in Japan B, Customs Duties,
Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, adopted 10 Nov. 1987, L/621634S/83, para. 1.1 (ﬁnding that measures to protect the domestic producers of traditional wines and liquors
used for ceremonial and religious occasions were GATT illegal).
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example, at the International Conference on Population and Development at Cairo
in 1994, the Final Declaration recognized the right of women to control their reproduction, but it provided that the implementation of this right ‘is the sovereign
right of each country consistent with full respect for the various religious and
ethical values and cultural backgrounds of its people’. Again at the UN Conference on Women at Beijing, there was substantial negotiation among the delegates
in order to accommodate cultural differences. The Beijing Declaration stated that
‘women’s rights are human rights’, but then reafﬁrmed the idea that women’s rights
were culturally determined. The platform declared that these rights were subject to
‘the signiﬁcance of and full respect for various religious and ethical values, cultural
backgrounds and philosophical convictions of individuals and their communities’.
The Beijing platform stressed the importance of religious beliefs and asserted the
need to respect religious differences.
One prominent example of subjecting international norms of gender equality to
cultural exceptions is the debate over female genital cutting. Defenders of female
genital cutting assert that it is central to their culture. Even among Western feminists,
some have accepted the idea that in formulating a position on this issue, we must
accommodate cultural attitudes of the developing countries.
It is nearly impossible to engage in a discussion of women’s rights under international law without having to address cultural claims. By contrast, other human
rights norms, such as the right to be free from arbitrary detention or torture or the
right to worship and to self-expression, are not qualiﬁed by cultural exceptions.
In sum, international law does not treat cultural exceptions consistently. One
explanation for this inconsistency may be the complex relationship between international law, culture, and globalization. As globalization has opened up markets, it
has caused cultural dislocations. Import competition has displaced local producers
and traditional communities. Foreign products and companies have introduced new
attitudes, values, and practices.
Globalization has created a cultural backlash. In a rapidly changing and uncertain
world, people are anxious to retain some of their traditions. The cultural backlash
has taken many forms throughout the world. Examples include anti-immigration
movements, anti-Semitism, Islamic and Christian fundamentalism, Hindu nationalism, opposition to birth control, and homophobia.
Cultural exceptions are a legalistic expression of displaced anxiety towards globalization. International law rejects cultural claims when they interfere with the
process of globalization. When states argue for cultural exceptions against trade
norms or economic regulations, including environmental regulations, they risk
disrupting the free ﬂow of globalized markets. Alternatively, when states argue for
cultural exceptions to gender equality norms, there is no threat to globalization. Popular anxiety over globalization’s cultural consequences can be safely displaced onto
women without risking the process of globalization. Countries that feel powerless in
the world market and dislocated by the rapid pace of cultural changes brought by the
world market, seek to reassert their sovereignty through the regulation of gender
differences. When politicians can no longer claim to maintain full employment,
control prices, or restrict foreign companies, they can still restrict birth control and
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abortion, limit the educational and occupational opportunities of women, and control the right to marry, divorce, and exercise personal autonomy within the family.
Indeed, to an increasing extent in both the industrialized and developing world,
gender difference may be one of the primary expressions of state power.
My ﬁnal point is that international law has left open the question of how to relate
to culture, and our project should be to resist cultural claims. Cultural autonomy is an
incoherent idea because individuals have multiple cultural identities that are often
in conﬂict. When states seek to create cultural exceptions to legal norms, they are
privileging the traditions, values, and practices of one subgroup over another within
the same territory. If we permit cultural exceptions to international legal norms, we
are empowering the elites in each state to impose their values over disenfranchised
groups. One group’s cultural autonomy always subordinates another group’s culture.
International lawyers should be deeply suspicious of all cultural claims by states,
because culture is a contested concept that is deployed to divide us and deny international law’s claim to universalism. Throughout the world nationalist parties are
gaining power by promising to promote something they posit as ‘national culture’
against the ‘alien’ or non-traditional inﬂuence of immigrants, minorities, women,
and other states. As cultural resistance to global governance has grown more violent and less predictable, we should ﬁnd new legal strategies and institutions for
containing culture and resolving conﬂict.

G ROUP IV DISCUSSION
B. S. Chimni. I actually wanted one clariﬁcation from Professor Paul. How do you deal
with the whole notion of cultural imperialism? On one hand we should resist the
claims of a state when it is making these cultural claims, on the other hand at least
the third world countries are recipients of market culture. ‘Law and development’
culture is one kind of culture that is exported to the third world and we need to do
something about it. A second kind of cultural imperialism is where the contribution
of the cultures of third world civilizations is not really recorded in the narrative of
international law.
I wanted a clariﬁcation from Professor Kennedy: when you say that we need to
translate the vocabulary of legal expertise into political positions, what exactly do
you mean? Is this also part of the demystiﬁcation process? Is it really opening up
the text to suggest: look, here actually are some political positions, concealed behind
the legal text, and politics which we need to contest? Or is there something more to
this in the sense that our interpretations particularly of legal texts have to be linked
to certain movements of people? Are we talking about an organic intellectual in
the Gramscian sense or are we simply talking about an international law exercise
where we simply try to bring to the fore political positions?
Ben Novak. Does Professor Paul include religion in his term ‘culture’, because some
of the problems outlined in his paper can also be found in the relation between
religion and international law.
Paul. I do take religion and culture together, because in practice community
claims about culture are often linked with religion, or religious practices. I see a

923

924

I N T E R NAT I O NA L SY M P O S I U M O N T H E I N T E R NAT I O NA L L E GA L O R D E R

kind of irony in the notion of the third world protecting its culture from Western
culture. At least since the nineteenth century, culture has been used as a mark of
evolution. Culture has been romanticized in indigenous societies as a mark of their
underdevelopment. We have in a sense ‘respected’ culture in developing countries
by romanticizing the primitive aspect of these societies as ‘exotic’. Consider the
different treatment by the IWC of cultural claims by Norway and Japan to whale and
those by the indigenous populations. The IWC says that Norway and Japan have no
right to engage in whaling, despite centuries of whale-hunting, but indigenous tribal
groups such as the Makai in the north-west Paciﬁc do have such a right. The Makai
are an indigenous culture and somehow it seems more authentic in that context to
talk about culture. Yet the Makai have not whaled for at least a century, and when
they were given the right to engage in whaling, they had no idea how to do it. The US
navy equipped them with harpoon guns so that they could engage in their ‘tradition’
of whaling. The IWC attaches cultural signiﬁcance to the ‘primitive’ aspect of Makai
culture and disregards the same aspect in industrialized states. That is why I have
a very ambivalent response to claims about culture in the third world, because I do
think it is a way in which the ﬁrst world maintains a sense of its superiority over the
third world.
Stania. I should like to know what Helena Alviar understands by the concept of
modernization? Does she use it as a neutral concept or under ideological or social
or economic or any other concepts? Second, is there not a revival of the wish to go
back, for example, to agriculture? Third, say, for example, a neighbouring country
is trying to revive the ideology, or whatever you might call it, of Bolivar, who was
the founder of Gran Colombia. What does she think about the revival of ideology of
that kind?
Alviar. The term modernization is not a neutral term at all. I try in my work to
show how ideological the term is and how it is composed of political ideals. It is
composed of ideas of how the economy and culture should look. It is not a neutral
term at all, I think it is an ideological term.
The question about the revival of Bolivar’s ideology in the case of Venezuela is
very difﬁcult. He has been considered the liberator of the continent, but there can
also be a very conservative way of reading what he was and what he represented.
Actually Bolivar was not that much of a pluralist, so I would be cautious about the
revival of that type of ideology.
Kennedy. I should like to respond to Professor Chimni’s question about the
translation of expert vocabularies into political vocabularies. I wanted to evoke
two traditions of political contestation. One is the tradition you describe of translating an expert vocabulary into terms which we understand to be in political contestation – we are used to political contestation in ideological terms, in terms of left,
right and centre, or in terms of well-deﬁned social interests, like labour, capital and
so forth. There is a difﬁcult intellectual work in doing this kind of translation, and
I think it would be better for international law if there were more opportunities
and more well-developed habits of making this kind of translation. But I do not
see translations of this type as ‘demystifying’ – I see them as ‘remystifying’. That
is, the vocabularies of political resistance, which fantasize interests or ideological
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positions in contestation, are very similar to the ideas of cultural resistance, national
resistance, or to a term like modernization. These are all vocabularies that mystify a
much more complex political situation. Here I would associate myself completely
with Professor Simonia’s earlier remarks on culture, that the actual situation is one
of intense overlapping hybridization, which is very difﬁcult to pin down in one idea
or programme as in ‘it is always better for the most primitive culture to win’. In
my view, there is nothing a priori wrong with one culture exercising inﬂuence over
another. It happens all the time. Similarly, I ﬁnd nothing wrong with one people
governing another, which also happens all the time. The question is, how do they
do it and what are the distributive consequences of their doing it? What are the
modes of engagement that are permitted and excluded? What space is there for
which alternative cultures? What are the micro consequences of this rule rather
than some other? And all this is much more difﬁcult to tease out. So although I think
that this ﬁrst tradition of political translation, which focuses on the transformation
of expert choices into ideological or interest contestations, is useful, it can also be a
trap, because we can think that we have really got to the bottom of politics, when
we have only just begun. We may have understood what is really going on with the
interests of labour and the interests of capital, but we all know from a thousand
disappointments that the interests of labour are multiple, the interests of capital are
multiple, and all sorts of different possible alliances are overlooked in that kind of
overstressed contestation.
Consequently, the tradition of politicization to which I am much more attracted
is a much more Protestant one, if I might say that, in which politics is an experience
the individual has. The experience of being political is the experience of having shed
the idea of acting in accordance with expertise or best practice and being open to
the responsible exercise of authority over other people in a situation of unknowing.
This, basically, is how I would read the Protestant side of Karl Schmidt. My sense is
that creating situations in which more individuals in the governing class experience
what they do as political in this sense, precisely in the sense that they are deciding
something for other people without knowing whether it is the right thing or not
and nevertheless having to take responsibility, would be a good thing. We would
be better off if our political culture encouraged experts to decide in a spirit of an
unknowing hope for grace, rather than in a spirit of exercising complex expertise.
I was trying earlier to stress this second idea of politicization – a politicization of
the individual experience of the expert rather than a once and for all translation of
the vocabulary so that we will know where politics lies. Politics lies where people
believe they are free and that’s it.
Leopold Specht. I have serious doubts about this proposal. I think that Kennedy’s
conversation with Chimni poses the following dilemma: what does emancipation
mean? What does contestation mean? Does it mean solving the problem of mere
existence, in political theory the decision of life and death, the preservation of the
integrity of persons? You are discussing at the level of the Palestinian farmer who is
no longer entitled to receive water, and there are many examples of this kind. And
I think that on this level what you have put forward does not make sense, because
it is very clear that for the Palestinian farmer his problem is a material situation. At
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another level, where you start to talk about a proliferation of cultures, of expertise,
your proposal makes sense entirely. Now what I would be interested in is how to link
the ﬁrst with the second. Of course I can imagine having problems in this country
which at a certain point reduces our choice to that between life and death, to the
bare existence of humanity, but this is not as likely as in the case of the occupation
of Palestinian territory. My question is, after we have adopted your proposal, how do
you combine these various levels?
Kennedy. I am agnostic but doubtful that there is a level of existence which we
could call subsisting below the symbolic. It seems to me that in every culture, no
matter how low the income level is, we will ﬁnd a surplus above the conditions of
existence. We might say that people are living everywhere in a cultural frame in
which resources are allocated on a basis of norms and the judgements of experts,
regardless of how impoverished they seem. Consequently, I do not share the vision
of a farmer, Palestinian or otherwise, making decisions about his or her material
needs in a kind of authentic lunge into life. I see people pursuing strategies through
technical know-how and expertise. In that sense, it seems a continuous ladder from
there all the way up to the level of the political leaders of a place like Colombia.
We heard those political elites described as making decisions about modernization,
experiencing their struggle as a relationship between their internal sense of themselves as liberals and conservatives, their sense of Colombia in a peripheral catch-up
situation, their idea in a given historical period about what the dominant expertise
on modernization offers as political alternatives and triage within these struggles.
When I imagine members of the political class in this way, it seems that nine out of
ten people are in ﬂight from responsibility. They are hanging out with hegemonic
actors, but none of them want to be the person who pushes the button. They all want
to be the person who ﬁgured out that they had to do it this way for some reason.
It is so common for people to feel that ‘everyone else in this system has discretion,
but me’, because I am a leftist, because I am a conservative, because I represent the
bank, because my boss will not let me, because modernization requires it, because
of culture. So people are in ﬂight from political responsibility, and the international
legal order, in my view, encourages them to be. My only suggestion is that we rethink
the situation, so that people operating in a symbolic world – from the Palestinian
farmer to the Colombian modernizer – have more opportunities and are more often
encouraged to reach towards the ﬁre of responsible action in unknowing, rather
than to ﬂee from it into whatever forms of expertise the system makes available
at that time. A concrete example would be Europe ﬂeeing from responsibility for
opposition to the Iraq war into the idea of multilateral decision-making. That goes
for the American left. The whole discussion – ‘if only the UN decides to do it, then it
is ﬁne’ – puts to one side the questions of whether it is a good idea or not, who will
suffer by it, how long will it take, what actually will be the consequences for political
life in the Middle East afterwards. Those things are lost because we found another
way of talking about it as the debate between multilateral and unilateral. Or take the
International Criminal Court. I personally oppose the International Criminal Court
because my intuition about the consequences of institutionalizing an International
Criminal Court is that it will offer the opportunity for political elites to shed the
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problem of responsibility. Of course it will have many other effects, some good.
On balance, it seems an opportunity, like so much of the human rights judicative
machinery, for political elites to avoid the experience of distributing resources to
other people and accepting the consequences in their own name.
Lanc. Do we have enough or too much international law? That German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder did not want to take part in the action against Iraq proposed by
President Bush was very surprising. Soon after Schröder was ﬁrst installed he had to
visit Washington for the ﬁftieth anniversary of NATO, and there he was immediately
confronted with the decision, counter to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, that NATO
could intervene militarily outside NATO territory. It was thus felt that from the start
he had not been very pleased to be confronted with this decision. It is signiﬁcant
that there was another president of the United States at that time, so that it is not
just a question of Bush being president. But what options in the long term has the
newly re-elected Schröder vis-à-vis Bush? There is Daimler Chrysler, the presence
of 100,000 US military personnel in Germany, using air bases in Germany as a vital
facility for actions in various parts of the world, especially in our part of the world. So
to some extent many countries, not only Germany, are occupied. How far can these
countries make free decisions? Are they partners coming together to make a legal
decision under the same preconditions, or not? It is another kind of situation described by our friend Chimni as arising in the case of underdeveloped countries. This
all inﬂuences, in my opinion, the way in which a legal order can be implemented
even if one thinks that what is existing in international law is sufﬁcient.
Specht. I think that David Kennedy and I agree that they get up in the morning, do
it, and then think about something else. Is this right? Can I come back to my doubts?
Can I rephrase my question? So, if mention of the Enlightenment is not helpful, let
me try it in another version: are you suggesting a turning from the Catholic to the
Protestant version of representation?
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